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Hans-Rudolf Horn, Wiesbaden / Germany 
 
Judicial Review in the Democratic System 
 
Abstract:  When  judges  are  authorised  to  invalidate  legal  acts  for  being  unconstitutional,  the 
competence of the legislator is directly concerned. The question raises, if thus judges do not usurp 
legislative power. In the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers the parliament is the first 
power, based on its direct democratic legitimacy. Yet cancelling legal acts completely or partially 
does evoke more irritations in the public that could be expected. The people seem to have more 
confidence to the assumed impartiality of the judges than to the results of the parliamentary work 
which seems to be dominated by the struggles of the parties. The necessity of judicial review mainly is 
based on the consideration that individual rights even in an authentic democratic system may be 
violated by a legal act of the parliament. In this case constitutional courts have the very task to defend 
individual rights, principles of liberty and authentic equality. Therefore it is justified to speak of the 
“jurisdiction of liberty”, as the Italian constitutional expert Cappelletti has said. But also without 
such  legitimacy  in  many  countries  the  Courts  intervene  in  the  field  of  the  legislator.  The  courts 
themselves  discuss  the  limits  of  judicial  interventions,  emphasising  themselves,  that  they  have  to 
respect  the  legislative  decisions  principally,  but  do  not  abide  always  by  their  own  proclaimed 
principles. In Spanish recent publications it is spoken of the principle “in dubio pro legislatore”, (in 
case  of  doubt  in  favour  the  legislator),  reminding  of  “in  dubio  pro  reo”,  in  order  to  treat  the 
legislative power not worse than the defendant in a criminal process.. 
Keywords: separation of powers, judicial review, judicial activism,..  
 
I. Introduction 
I would like to add some remarks to the discussion on the judicial review in democratic 
systems.  The  idea  of  the  judicial  control  of  stature  laws  had  been  developed  by  the  US 
Supreme  Court;  it  was  introduced  soon  also  in  Spanish  America,  first  in  Venezuela  and 
Mexico, but later also in Brazil, where the judiciary power in recent times has been playing an 
eminent role.The idea of the judicial review had been developed by the US Supreme Court; it 
was introduced soon also in Spanish America, where the principle of the supremacy of statute 
law properly still kept prevailing since the Spanish law system. In the traditional doctrine of 
the separation of powers the parliament is the first power, based on its direct democratic 
legitimacy. But the obvious detraction from the legislator’s reputation, by cancelling legal 
acts  completely  or  partially,  does  irritate  the  public  in  democracies  less  than  it  could  be 
expected. Yet there are some critical publications of academic authors whose number seems 
to be growing. A possible explanation is the rather low standing of the parliamentary work,  
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maybe also because of the some times disgusting qualities of the political discussions, which 
seems to be dominated by the struggles of parties. Therefore a lot of people prefer to have 
more confidence to the impartiality of the judges than to the results of democratic debates.  
The number of the countries with a constitutional jurisdiction is still growing around the 
world, although in some countries harsh conflicts between government and parliament on the 
one hand, and the constitutional court on the other can be observed. Even in France where the 
primacy of the parliament since the French Revolution was one of the most sacred principles, 
in the last years lawyers and politicians use to demonstrate that there also exists a system of a 
real constitutional jurisdiction, exercised by the Constitutional Courts.  
 
II. Origin of the American judicial review 
The historical origin of the judicial review already has been researched many times around the 
world very thoroughly.
1 The famous decision “Marbury versus Madison”, more than two 
hundred years ago, generally considered the greatest of all landmark cases, became the topic 
of  international  discussions  and  congresses.  It  became  the  object  of  an  almost  religious 
adoration, only disturbed by some critical examinations of the legal qualities of its reasons, 
circumstances and motivations. These aspects deserve some more examinations.  
After the victory of President Thomas Jefferson in the elections of 1800 the Congress still 
with a majority of the Federalists enacted a controversial Judiciary Act that created 58 new 
judgeships, including 42 judgeships of the peace. President John Adams, the loser of the 
elections, in his last night in office March 3, 1801, signed their commissions of the famous 
“midnight judges”. His still acting Secretary of State, John Marshall, had to affix the great 
seal  of the  United States.  In the confusion some commissions  went  undelivered. But  the 
commission on the appointment of John Marshall himself as chief justice of the Supreme 
Court obviously did not remain undelivered. The new Secretary of State, James Madison, 
directed  by  President  Jefferson,  withholds  17  of  the  42  commissions,  including  that  of 
William Marbury, the plaintiff of the famous process.  
His way to the Supreme Court was opened by the so called writ of mandamus according 
to the Judicial Act of 1789. Marshall stated the validity of the appointment of Marbury as 
judge of peace and admitted that the writ of mandamus is properly a right remedy, but he 
denied the question if the Supreme Court is the right court. This smart solution was possible 
by declaring unconstitutional the law because of the maintained contradiction to the article 3 
of the Constitution, which had laid down the competences of the Supreme Court. Yet it is the 
                                                           
1 E. g. by Charles F. Hobson, 2000, and critically by Roland Bork, 1990, and forthcoming 2003, but especially 
also in Spanish, as e.g. Fernández 1997 and 2003, and Fix-Zamudio & Carmona 2000.   
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decisive  question,  if  thus  all  other  possibilities  to  apply  the  Supreme  Court  should  be 
excluded as Marshall stated. Constitutional norms generally renounce to define completely all 
details in such context, but leave the execution of the constitutional norm to the ordinary 
legislator, a general idea, as it is also expressed at the end of the article 3 section 2 of the 
Constitution, mentioning “Regulations as the Congress shall make”. Since the competence of 
the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury is not mentioned explicitly in the constitutional 
text, Marshall held it to be excluded according to the rule argumentum e contrario, without 
citing it. But the decision between argumentum e contrario and analogy is always a matter of 
a  specific  evaluation.  An  analogy  to  the  competencies  named  in  Constitution  could  be 
considered even more reasonable. “Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party” 
are explicitly mentioned in art. 3 section 2 as object of the competence of the Court. Madison 
was not personally the defendant, but actually the government was sued. The fundamental 
issue of the relation between statute law and the Constitution was not the real object of the 
process.  Insofar  it  can  be  said  that  the  remarkable  statements  on  judicial  review  which 
impressed so many people such a long time, essentially are mere obiter dicta, that means, 
general considerations which were not the essential base for the foundation of the sentence. 
Robert H. Bork has called the famous sentence a grave sin of judicial activism.
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III. Critical Trends of US Constitutional Jurisdiction 
More than half a century went by, until the Supreme Court stated again the unconstitutionality 
of a federal regulation. In the case Dred Scott versus Sandford  a Negro slave in 1857 lost his 
liberty again, when he was brought back to the State of Missouri by his master, where the 
Missouri Court 1850 had declared him free. The case of Dred Scott was discussed in the 
whole country. The hopes of President Buchanan and of many citizens were disappointed. 
The Court stated that the Congress of the United States had no power to limit the expansion of 
slavery  by  law,  as  the  Missouri  Compromise  of  1820  had  done.  By  this  sentence  the 
opportunity was failed to open a peaceful way to settle the slavery question. The final solution 
was only possible at the end the Civil War with more than 600 000 dead men.  
After the Civil War the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was reluctant to recognise the 
rights of the coloured population, which just got their liberty. In 1896 the decision Plessy 
versus.  Ferguson  was  the  base  of  a  permanent  jurisdiction,  whose  consequence  was  the 
establishment  of  an  effective  racial  segregation,  disguised  by  the  euphemistic  formula 
                                                           
2 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America, The Political Seduction of Law, 1990.   
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separate but equal. Not until the year 1954.
3 the Court abandoned its jurisdiction, but only 
“with all deliberate speed”
4 the legislation could complete the slaves’ liberation by a great 
legislation programme especially during the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. 
The antagonism between judges and legislators was manifested several times in the field 
of social protection. In 1905 the Supreme Court cancelled a law which restricted the working 
hours for bakers in one week to 60, by the way against the dissenting vote of Chief Justice 
Holmes. In the time of the economic crisis certain legislative measures became indispensable 
to face the results of the great unemployment and the need of those who lost their money in 
the times after the black Friday. Urgent laws of social character in the frame of the politics of 
New Deal were annulled by a chain of no less than twelve decisions. “No issue so great or so 
deep  has  raised  in  America  since  secession”,  as  Walter  Lippmann  commented.
5  The 
legislators did not succeed to achieve their goals by modifying acts to adapt them to the 
considerations of the judges. Roosevelt developed a plan “to pack” the Supreme Court” by 
enlarging it to get the opportunity o appoint new justices. The majority of five judges of the 
Supreme Court, called the “five horsemen”, prevented mercilessly the President’s policy of 
New Deal, approved by the American people in the elections of 1932, 1934 and 1936. Finally 
- as Roosevelt said – the Court began to interpret the Constitution instead of torturing it.”  
   
  IV. Legitimacy and limits of judicial review 
Already  the  first  American  Chief  Justice,  John  Jay,  clarified  the  indispensable  judicial 
restraint  early  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  history  by  declining  to  advice  President  George 
Washington on the constitutional implications of a proposed foreign policy decision. The 
Constitution  limits  the  Court  to  dealing  with  “cases”  and  “controversies”,  like  the 
Constitution says. Yet those old maxims in the real function of the Court have been modified 
by new procedural devices, like class actions, requests for declaratory relief and other means 
of  raising  abstract  constitutional  issues.  The  Supreme  Court  is  less  an  ordinary  court  of 
appeals but in the same sense like the European constitutional courts “a special organ of 
constitutional review”.
6  
Thus it is possible to discuss the problems of the legitimacy and the limits of the judicial 
review in a worldwide context, for the fundamental arguments keep being the same since the 
beginning of the constitutional jurisdiction. The most important argument is that even in an 
                                                           
3 US Supreme Court May 17, 1954 (Chief Justice Earl Warren) . 
4 US Supreme Court May 31, 1955. 
5 Mason & Beany, 1959, p. 179. 
6 Cappelletti & Cohen 1979, p. 95, Fernández 2003, p. 50.   
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authentic democracy it cannot  be excluded, that  individual rights  may  be detracted in  an 
unbearable extent by a legal act of the parliament. In this case the courts are the best branch 
for defending the individual rights. Although we also have seen that important sentences in 
the  history  of  the  US  Supreme  Court  did  neglect  the  principles  of  liberty  and  authentic 
equality, in the long run they fulfilled their mission to protect human and social rights in an 
efficient manner. It had become a model for the world as “jurisdiction of liberty”, as the 
Italian  constitutional  expert  Cappelletti  has  expressed  this  essential  idea  in  a  convincing 
form.
7 
But the real task of the “jurisdiction of liberty” does not include a judicial activism as a 
base of bold political decisions, ignoring that the other two branches generally represent the 
popular  majority,  making  fair  decisions  for  most  people,  like  it  is  emphasised  in  several 
judicial sentences themselves. Yet when nowadays in some countries the legislation does not 
have the rank, properly attributed by the constitution, that is not only the consequence of 
judicial  activism  interfering  in  the  field  of  the  legislation,  but  also  of  the  reluctance  of 
legislature bodies themselves to decide on controversial matters and of the tendency to wait 
for  a  sentence  of  the  constitutional  court  to  solve  a  difficult  problem.  In  Germany  the 
constitutional judges themselves urge the legislator in their sentences or in publications to 
decide political maters itself. Instead of showing courage to do so, prevail attempts to find 
out,  what  may  be  the  Constitutional  Court  opinion,  has  been  called  a  form  of  modern 
astrology. 
It can be observed that constitutional Courts realize their own opinions neglecting 
8the 
legislative intentions without reasons prescribed by the constitution. Even in matters of m ere 
technical character, the experiences of experts and of specialised high courts were ignored. In 
the case of the raising of the fees for public broadcasting the parliaments of all German 
Länder (states) had unanimously decided a raise of 88 cent monthly  instead of 1,09 € as the 
broadcasting  companies  had  requested,  that  means  a  difference  of  28  cent.  The  Federal 
Constitutional Court stated in its sentence of 2007 a violation if the freedom of broadcasting 
and invalidated the laws of the Länder.
9 
In  the  year  2010  the  German  Court  invalidated  a  law  on  data  storage  of 
telecommunications, as it was requested in a complaint of unconstitutionality.
10 The fear that 
individual liberty may be jeopardized, is not justified essentially, for the storage refers only to 
                                                           
7 Cappelletti 1961. 
8 Cfr. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July, 8, 2011 „Nach Anruf Selbstmord“ (Suicide after call) 
9 Sentence of Septembe, 11, 2007, 1 BvR 2270/05, 1BvR 802/06 
10 Sentence from March, 2. 2010. i BvR 256, 263 und 585/08  
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the date of the call, but not to its contents. Anyway thus it becomes more difficult not only to 
discover  terrorists,  but  also  swindlers  who  deceive  especially  old  persons  by  dirty  tricks 
pretending for instance that someone is   grandson needing money. 
8 Another field where 
constitutional courts intervene in the competence of parliaments are social regulations. The 
German Federal Constitutional Court had cancelled complicated regulations on social security 
(“Hartz IV”).
11 Now it is a reason of harsh discussions on the real intentions of the Court. But 
is typical that in the public opinion hardly nobody blames the court, but the politicians for 
neglecting the problem of the poor unemployed people.  
The parliamentarian decisions are based on an open discussion including the arguments 
of the several groups of the population. From the beginning of the judicial review the US 
Supreme Court developed doctrines of judicial restraint, which in similar forms are playing 
important parts in many other legal systems, especially in Germany, Italy and Spain, whilst 
the original “doctrine of political question” has not the same ranking as in the USA, where it 
became an element of the moderate judicial activism.
12 Obviously all the decisions of the 
highest courts always have a political impact, also when they themselves pretend to avoid any 
intervention.   
The doctrine of judicial restraint includes several points of view as the  doctrine of strict 
necessity,  particularly  in  view  of  possible  consequences  for  others  stemming  also  from 
constitutional roots and the inherent limitations of the judicial process. As the US Supreme 
Court stated in a sentence of 1911, it is one of the most important maxims of constitutional 
interpretation, that courts are concerned only with the constitutionality of legislation and not 
its motives, policy or wisdom.
13 Justice Frankfurter has said “We do not sit like a kadi under a 
tree, dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.”
14  In Spanish 
recent publications it was spoken of the principle “in dubio pro legislatore”, (in case of doubt 
in favour the legislator), reminding of the clause “in dubio pro reo”.
15 For it would be absurd 
to treat the legislature power worse than the defendant in a criminal process. In the USA the 
idea  to  presume  in  favour  of  the  law’s  validity  was  expressed  already  1827  by  Justice 
Bushrod Washington.
16 
                                                           
11  Sentence February, 9, 2010, 1 BvL 1, 3 und 4/09 
12  Bruce Ackermann, (1998)  We the People. Transformations, Cambridge/Lonon, p.99-119, 345-382, in the 
same way Martin Shapior (1964), Law and Politicas and the Supreme Court, London p. 180 ff. , César Landa, 
(2000)  Justicia  constitutional  y  political  questions,  in:  Anuario  Iberomaericano  de  Justicia  Constitucional 
4/2000, p. 173, 178. 
13Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U.S. 575, 580 (1911). 
14 Justice Frankfurter (dissenting) in Terminello vs. City of Chicago, 337 U.S., 1, 11 (1949).  
15 Horn 2002, 242. 
16 in Ogden vs. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213, 270 (1827). There are decisions in the same sense also 
already in 1810 and 1871.   
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It  calls  the  attention  that  the  necessary  doctrines  to  protect  the  legislators  against 
inadequate interventions of the judges, are expressed in dissenting opinions – as it happened 
several times also in sentences of the German Constitutional Court - or in rather old American 
sentences. Often it could be observed that opinions, which originally were dissenting, later 
became the ruling ones. This desirable development can be promoted by laying down the 
essential principles in constitutional or legal texts to ensure that judges do no usurp legislative 
faculties. There is a serious warning against a transition from the democratic state of rule of 
law to a “state of an obligarchy of judges” in which the judicial review does not abide by the 
frames of the democratic system. 
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